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The aim of this paper is to analyze how employees may a⁄ect ￿rm￿ s corporate
governance. In particular, we analyze a shareholder-manager relationship through a
principal-agent framework. The manager is the agent in charge of taking decisions
for ￿rm￿ s success. Yet, when deciding, the manager takes into account employees￿
preferences, i.e. the manager wants to enjoy a "quiet life". Our result highlight that
having a quiet-life manager is not necessarily linked to destroy value, as suggested
in recent research. It might even recover part of the e¢ cient decisions (at a cost
borne by the shareholder).
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1 Introduction
Corporate governance has been traditionally studied from the perspective of the exist-
ing conzict between ￿rm￿ s owners (shareholders) and who runs the ￿rm (the manager).1
The main concern of the shareholder is, then, how to provide the manager with enough
incentives and/or how to monitor manager￿ s activities to induce him to select the right
decision (from shareholder￿ s point of view), since otherwise, the manager would pursue
his own interests which are typically assumed to be ine¢ cient. However, which is the
1Shlei⁄er and Vishny (1997) states that Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers
of ￿nance to corporations assures themselves of getting a return on their investment. This classical
de￿nition includes not only shareholders but also creditors. Since by law shareholders are less protected








personal goal that a manager might follow as well as the departures that it imposes from
shareholder￿ s objectives has to be de￿ned. Several theories aim at explaining such de-
parture. Perk consumption has been highlighted as one of the main motivation that a
manager might follow, for example in the seminal papers of Jensen and Meckling (1976)
or Fama and Jensen (1983) to name just a few. An alternative departure behavior is
known as the empire-building motivation where it is assumed that the size of the pri-
vate bene￿ts that a manager may enjoy increases with the size of the ￿rm (the larger
the ￿rm, the larger the opportunities to extract resources). Nonetheless, recent research
proposes an alternative managerial bias aiming at explain which is the goal that departs
manager from shareholder￿ s maximization value. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) em-
pirically shows that when a manager is insulated from takeovers, workers wages rise as
well as the creation of new plants or the destruction of old plants falls. The authors
suggest that avoiding con￿ ict with employees appears to be a potential reason that can
explain manager￿ s behavior when taking decisions. Therefore, in order to have a better
understanding of corporate governance, it is necessary not to restrict the problem just
to a con￿ ict between managers and shareholders. Even if this is the main con￿ ict on
corporate governance enlarging our view by including other members of the ￿rm, i.e. the
stakeholders, may help to have a more complete ￿gure of the analysis.2 In this line, for
instance, Pagano and Volpin (2005) or Cespa and Cestone (2004) analyze how a manager
can set informal contracts with di⁄erent stakeholders as a mechanism to entrench his
position in the ￿rm, i.e., avoiding hostile takeovers. In Pagano and Volpin (2005), the
authors claim that manager and employees are "natural allies" against new acquires. The
manager tends to o⁄er a lax employment policy as a mechanism to reduce the likelihood
of being under an hostile takeover. The main e⁄ect is driven because the manager wants
to enjoy a "quiet-life", i.e. the manager is not willing to monitor employees since he does
not internalize the costs from not doing it. In Cespa and Cestone (2004), the authors
show that the manager is able to set informal contract with stakeholders di⁄erent than
employees as a mechanism to entrench his position at the ￿rm. Di⁄erently from Pagano
and Volpin (2005), they show that when this implicit agreements are made explicit, the
2There has been a recent debate towards the role of the stakeholder society in economics. By stake-
holder we refer to any participant of the ￿rm apart from shareholders, that is to say, employees, suppliers,
customers or local community. Several authors like Tirole (2001) or Allen and Gale (2002) appoints the








ability of the manager to increase his discretion (to entrench his position) is no longer
possible. Hence, these authors suggest that shareholder may have a sel￿sh interest in
promoting a stakeholder society. This last e⁄ect is possible since the authors assume that
both the shareholders and stakeholders may have congruence of interests. Our paper fol-
lows this strand of research by considering that managers wants to enjoy a "quiet-life" in
the ￿rm. We di⁄er from Pagano and Volpin (2005) and Cespa and Cestone (2004) since
we do not consider how this informal relations within di⁄erent members of the ￿rm may
a⁄ect the market for corporate control. Instead we are concerned in analyzing how this
behavior may a⁄ect ￿rm￿ s internal decisions. We consider that the manager has discre-
tion on the selection of the ￿rm￿ s strategy and also the implementation of it (that is to
say, the board is rubber-stamping). It is important to remark that, di⁄erently from the
papers mentioned above, we do not model explicitly employees￿ behavior. We model the
shareholder-manager relationship by means of a principal-agent model where the manager
is aligned, up to some degree, with employees￿ preferences. In particular, we assume that
the production process takes place in two stages. First of all, the manager chooses the
￿rm￿ s strategy (where does the ￿rm want to go?).3 We assume that the manager has the
discretion to choose only among two possible strategies: one alternative provides higher
growth opportunities although it is riskier. Once the project is selected, the manager un-
dertakes the level of e⁄ort (day by day decisions) enhancing ￿rm￿ s value. An important
element of our model is that the choice of the ￿rm￿ s strategy by the manager in the ￿rst
stage has an e⁄ect not only on the level of risk borne by the ￿rm but also on the manager￿ s
cost of e⁄ort. In other words, if the manager opts for the strategy that employees would
like to be chosen, then managing the ￿rm is less costly vis-a-vis the alternative strategy.
To be precise, if employees would be able to choose among both strategies, they chose
the most safety strategy available and they will make the ￿rm easy to run in this case.
4 Our results shows that having a quiet-life manager might not be directly related with
3We take the terminology of ￿rm￿ s strategy from Perotti and Von Thadden (2006). Similar to them, by
￿rm￿ s strategy we refer to the choice between two disjoint projects. Since it has no link with interaction
we will focus during the model with the concept of project.
4In particular, Faleye et al. (2005) ￿nds out that if employees are paid through an ESOP (Employee
Stock Option Plan), the ￿rm typically tend to select less risky projects. In Aoki (1988) it is shown that
a diversi￿cation policy may become the outcome from a cooperative agreement between managers and








an ine¢ cient outcome, as proposed by Pagano and Volpin (2005). On the contrary, if the
manager has discretion not only about the level of e⁄ort but also about the choice of the
￿rm￿ s strategy, we ￿nd out that there may be cases where the manager choose more often
the e¢ cient strategy concerning a situation where the manager only controls the level of
e⁄ort. There exist two e⁄ects driving this result. The ￿rst e⁄ect concerns the assumption
on manager￿ s preferences for a quiet-life since this will tend to favour employees￿ preferred
project. The second e⁄ect relies on how important is the risk-taking vis-a-vis the quiet-life
e⁄ect. If risk-taking is not very important relative to the quiet-life behavior, having a
quiet-life manager partially solves ine¢ cient decision taking regarding the choice of the
project. Recovering e¢ cient decisions is borne by the shareholders since pro￿ts are lower
in comparison with the case where they can contract upon the ￿rm￿ s strategy. Yet, if
risk-taking is huge enough, this result is no longer true and a quiet-life manager implies
that the manager selects ine¢ cient project for more combination of parameters. Sum-
ming up, the role of a quite-life manager has been considered as an ine¢ cient behavior,
as suggested by Pagano and Volpin (2005). Our results claim that this is not necessarily
true since this biais may help to recover e¢ ciency of the ￿rm￿ s strategy (at a cost borne
by shareholders). Hence, we expect to enrich the debate around corporate governance
reforms, since improving shareholder￿ s protection might come not only at a cost for man-
agers but also ine¢ cient decision taking. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
the model is presented. We determine the optimal contract under symmetric and asym-
metric information in Section 3. We study the optimal contract when the manager has
discretion over one decision (the level of e⁄ort) or both (the level of e⁄ort and the choice
of the project) and compare the optimal decisions under asymmetric information with the
e¢ cient decisions (or decisions taken under symmetric information). Section 5 concludes
and presents future research. All proofs are included in an Appendix.
2 Model
Consider the following economic situation described in ￿gure 1. Initially, a shareholder
(the ￿rm￿ s owner) o⁄ers a contract to a manager. If the manager accepts, he runs the
￿rm. We assume that the shareholder do not have the time or they lack the experience








The manager is hired in order to take decisions for enhancing shareholder￿ s value.
Yet, we consider that the managerial decisions or the production process takes place in
two di⁄erent steps. Firstly, the manager chooses which is the project to select (the ￿rm￿ s
strategy following Perotti and Von thadden terminology). Roughly speaking, that decision
regards the level of risk the company is willing to cope. We will denote this decision by
P. Secondly, the second decision is related with the expected value of the ￿rm. That is
to say, once the project is chosen, the manager takes decisions in order to enhance the










Figure 1: Timeline of the model
2.1 Choice of project and e⁄ort
The manager must select which is the ￿rm￿ s project. We simplify the choice of the project
by allowing him to choose only among two possible alternatives. The former will be called
"safe" and the latter "risky". Roughly speaking, a safe project reduces, in relative terms,
the riskiness of the company although it has also a lower expected value of the ￿rm.
For the sake of simplicity, at the stage 3 the manager must choose among the following
two alternatives P 2 fR;Sg. Therefore, given P the expected ￿rm￿ s value is:
yP = eP ￿ rdP + ￿P
where ￿P ￿ N(0;￿P) P 2 fR;Sg where and eP is the e⁄ort implemented by the manager
once the project is already chosen. Hence, given the same level of e⁄ort, choosing safe
implies a lower expected value for the ￿rm, although it is less risky. Formally, dS = 1 >
dR = 0 and ￿S < ￿R:5 We assume that the manager has to choose one project or the other
5Obviously, we consider that the choice of the strategy only a⁄ects the mean and the variance of the
company. We are aware that the riskiness of the company (any random variable) might include other









project, but we do not allow for a combination of both. This can be justi￿ed because the
￿rm need a ￿x or even a sunk investment. Finally, we assume that the e⁄ort cannot be
veri￿ed by the shareholder.
We interpret r as the opportunity cost of reducing the riskiness of the company. For
instance, the manager may decide to diversify ￿rm￿ s activities. Obviously, diversifying
does not necessarily lead to a destruction of the expected value of the company. Yet,
the shareholder can diversify their investments at least as good as the manager through
the capital market and not through the ￿rm. We can also interpret both projects by
considering that the "risky" project o⁄ers better growth opportunities, i.e. investing in
new emerging markets while "safe" means reinvesting in your own country.
2.2 Economic agents
As commented previously, the owners are risk neutral while the manager is risk averse.
Thus, the shareholder￿ s utility function depends only on the expected value of the ￿rm.
that is to say,
US = E(profits)
which in turn imply that shareholder￿ s pro￿ts depends on the the choice of the project.
For instance, given the same level of e⁄ort, a risk neutral shareholder would prefer to
choose "risky".
The manager￿ s decisions over ￿rm￿ s project is the key point in this model. We assume
that the choice of the project will have an e⁄ect not only on the riskiness of the company
but also on the cost of managing human resources. Following Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003), or Jensen (1986) we consider that the manager￿ s decisions tend to be biased
towards employees￿preferences. This implies that the manager has a tendency to choose
the most preferred project from the employee￿ s point of view. As commented in the
introduction, we assume that, among the available projects, employees would like to
We are aware that dS = 1 > dR = 0 is not withot loss of generality. Therefore, the interpretation








choose the safest one.6 Thus, the manager￿ s utility function takes the following form:
Um(W;e) = u(W) ￿
v(eP)
1 + adP
where P 2 fS;Rg
where we separate income from e⁄ort just for simplicity and a > 0.7 The parameter
a re￿ ects the save on costs that the manager may achieve if the choice of the project
coincides with employees￿preferences, that is to say, the parameter re￿ ects how important
the "quiet-life" behavior is in the manager￿ s decision taking. A plausible interpretation of
di⁄erences in the cost may be found in the institutional framework: di⁄erent institutional
frameworks regarding labour market would re￿ ect di⁄erent values of a.8 Therefore, we
consider that the choice of the project has an implication on the level of e⁄ort that can
be achieved.
Finally, we assume, for the sake of simplicity, that manager￿ s preferences are of a
CARA type. Therefore, we may express the utility function of the manager through its
certainty equivalent.9 Thus, we restrict attention to linear contracts, i.e. contracts of the
form W = ￿+￿(yP) where ￿ is a ￿x payment independent of the outcome and ￿ depends
on the ￿rm￿ s performance. Thus, we can rewrite the manager￿ s utility function in the
following way









where P 2 fS;Rg and ￿ is the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coe¢ cient and we consider, just
for simplicity, the following quadratic manager￿ s cost of e⁄ort, v(e) = e2
2 . For instance,
we can rewrite manager￿ s certainty equivalent depending on the project selected. We can
observe how the selection of the project has an e⁄ect both on the risk-taking and on the
6It is important to highlight that we do not model employees behavior. We model a Shareholder-
Manager realtionship where employees a⁄ect, up to some degree, manager￿ s decisions. Regarding em-
ployees￿preferences Morck et al. (2002) empirically ￿nds that if employees are paid through an ESOP,
the ￿rm invests in less risky projects.
7We are aware that this simplication is not withot loss of generality. Therefore, the interpretation
includes both the quiet life behavior but also the dimension of the decision.
8Botero et al (2004) survey the di⁄erent institutional frameworks around the world. It is remarkable
the di⁄erences between the US or UK versus continental Europe.








manager￿ s cost of e⁄ort,




















3 Optimal contract with a "quiet-life" manager
3.1 Symmetric information or e¢ cient decisions
For the sake of comparison, let us analyze which is the e¢ cient policy that the ￿rm￿ s
owner should adopt in this framework. Consider, initially, that both the project and the
level of e⁄ort are veri￿able variables. Therefore, the owner of the company can write both
in a contract enforceable by the Court of Law. The optimal payment scheme and level
of e⁄ort are the solution to maximize the shareholder￿ s wealth given that the manager
accepts the contract. Formally, for P 2 fS;Rg
Max
f￿;￿;eg
BP = (1 ￿ ￿)E(yP) ￿ ￿
s:t: CEP ￿ U
where U represents the manager￿ s reservation utility. Since the e⁄ort is veri￿able and the
manager is risk averse while the shareholder is risk neutral, she o⁄ers a ￿x salary to the
manager (￿ = 0) in order to compensate him for the level of e⁄ort while she bears all the
risk. The e¢ cient level of e⁄ort is obtained by equating the marginal value of the project
with the marginal cost of the manager￿ s e⁄ort, i.e. v0(e) = e = 1 + adP for P 2 fS;Rg:
This means that the optimal level of e⁄ort that the shareholder can demand is, up to
some extent, constrained (or enhanced) by the employees￿in￿ uence: a higher manager￿ s
e⁄ort can be demanded whenever employees￿preferences are respected. As a result, the
shareholder must balance between a higher level of e⁄ort from choosing the safe project
and a higher expected value if the risky project is chosen. Formally, the level of pro￿ts




+ dP(a ￿ 2r) P 2 fS;Rg
It is important to highlight that the shareholder is risk neutral, and therefore the optimal








only on how employees may a⁄ect to the ￿rm￿ s management compared to the di⁄erences
on pro￿ts from choosing one project or the other. In particular, if r > a
2 the shareholder






Figure 1: Optimal decisions regarding the
choice of the strategy under symmetric
information
3.2 Asymmetric information
In this section we would like to focus on the role played by the discretion that a "quiet-life"
manager enjoy when deciding both on the choice of the project as well as the level of e⁄ort.
If the manager has discretion over the level of e⁄ort the shareholder will have the need to
provide incentives so as to reduce the moral hazard behavior. Yet, this optimal payment
scheme under moral hazard has real e⁄ect on shareholder￿ s decision upon the choice of
the ￿rm￿ s project by distorting them. Nevertheless, if the manager has also discretion
concerning ￿rm￿ s project, it may be the case that some of the e¢ ciency is recovered.
3.2.1 Asymmetric information: e⁄ort is not contractible
We consider instructive to present the case where the manager￿ s e⁄ort is not veri￿able
whereas the choice of the project is still veri￿able. By analyzing this case, we observe
that the level of e⁄ort is distorted due to the manager￿ s risk aversion. Moreover, we can
observe how the moral hazard on e⁄ort generates distortions on ￿rm￿ s project even if the








If the manager has discretion about the level of e⁄ort, he will choose the level that
maximizes his utility, i.e. eR 2 argmaxCER(￿;￿). Yet, as we can note, this decision
depends not only on the level of incentives provided by the shareholder but also on the
shareholder￿ s choice of the project. If the shareholder ￿nds worthy to implement the
"risky project". the level of incentives solve









) () eR = ￿ (ICCe when R)
that is to say, if the shareholder wants to implement a larger level of e⁄ort she must propose
a higher powered incentive scheme. Di⁄erently, if the shareholder would ￿nd optimal to
implement the safe project, the managerial incentives to exert e⁄ort are modi￿ed since
the manager ￿nd less costly to implement this project. Formally,









) () eS = (1 + a)￿ (ICCe when S)
highlighting the role of employees when a shareholder is contracting with a quiet-life
manager.
Therefore, the shareholder chooses the payment scheme anticipating this behavior in
order to maximize expected pro￿ts given that the manager accepts the contract as well
as she provides incentives to exert e⁄ort. If the shareholder wants to implement the risky
project, she looks for an optimal payment scheme and an induced level of e⁄ort solving
Max
f￿;￿;eg
BR = (1 ￿ ￿)eR ￿ ￿
s:t (PCR); (ICCe when R)
The solution to this program follows the classical trade-o⁄regarding providing incentives
with a risk-averse agent. That is to say, since e⁄ort is non-veri￿able, the shareholder
optimally links compensation to the only source of available information (given that the
outcome, this piece of information, is a noisy signal of manager￿ s e⁄ort). Yet, providing
incentives is costly since the manager is a risk-averse agent, which in turn implies that
the shareholder must pay a higher expected salary in order to let the manager accept the
contract. As a result, the optimal level of e⁄ort induced by the payment scheme is lower
than the e¢ cient case (as well as the level of pro￿ts).
In a similar way, we can replay the exercise when the shareholder would prefer to








one hand, implementing "safe" induces a lower cost of management of human resources,
measured by a and, on the other hand choosing safe has a lower expected a lower expected
value, which is measured by r. Formally,
Max
f￿;￿;eg
BS = (1 ￿ ￿)(eS ￿ r) ￿ ￿
s:t (PCS); (ICCe when S)
As already mentioned, when "safe" is selected the level of e⁄ort depends on the "quiet-
life" behavior and on the incentives provided through the mechanism scheme. Eventually,
the optimal level of incentives depends on the quiet life behavior, as well. Hence, let us
summarize the optimal contract in the following Lemma,
Lemma 1 The optimal contract f￿;￿;eg when e⁄ort is non-veri￿able displays the fol-
lowing characteristics:




R and BR =
￿R
2 ;
(b) if "safe" is chosen eS = ￿S(1 + a), ￿S = 1+a
1+a+￿￿2
S, and BS =
￿S(1+a)
2 ￿ r;
and in both cases ￿P is determined by CEP = U for P 2 fS;Rg:
Therefore, the shareholder decides which is the optimal choice of the project by com-
paring the level of pro￿ts when implementing the optimal payment scheme. Let us de￿ne






Rg as the combination of parameters where the share-
holder is indi⁄erent between implementing "risky" or "safe". Intuitively, the shareholder
will choose to implement "risky" if the opportunity cost from choosing "safe" are large
enough while "safe" should be selected if the opposite happens.
Proposition 1 When a quiet-life manager has discretion on the choice of e⁄ort, the
shareholder implements the risky project if r > r1 while the safe project is implemented if
the opposite takes place.
Thus, given the threshold r1 we identify which kind of distortions regarding project￿ s
choice are expected derived from the lack of veri￿ability on manager￿ s e⁄ort.
Proposition 2 Moral hazard over e⁄ort generates distortions over ￿rm￿ s project and
these distortions are shaped by di⁄erences over risk between both projects. To be precise:
(a) If these di⁄erences are large enough (￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿2
S￿2








"safe" in some situations where "risky" was e¢ cient.
(b) If di⁄erences are not large enough (￿￿2 < ￿￿2
S￿2
R), the shareholder￿ s distortions
depends on the quiet-life behavior:
b.1) for low values of a quite life behavior, i.e. a < ￿￿2
￿￿2
S￿2
R￿￿￿2, she chooses to implement
"safe" when "risky" is e¢ cient. This distortion takes place for a low opportunity cost
(low r).
b.2) for high values of a quiet life behavior, i.e. a > ￿￿2
￿￿2
S￿2
R￿￿￿2, she chooses to implement
while for high values "risky" is chosen when "safe" is e¢ cient. This distortion occurs for
a high opportunity cost (high r).
where ￿￿2 ￿ ￿2
R ￿ ￿2
S:
Our ￿rst result states that distortions compared to the e¢ cient decisions are obtained
around the e¢ cient threshold (r = a
2). In other words, if the opportunity cost is really high
the shareholder will select "risky" independently of the moral hazard behavior. Similarly,
if the concerns about employees are huge enouygh, that is to say, the quiet-life behavior
is important then we should observe "safe" as the optimal decision regardless of the
opportunity cost. In both cases, we do not have a con￿ ict between e¢ cient and optimal
decisions.
Yet, in the other cases, we have distortions on the shareholder￿ s selection of the ￿rm￿ s
project. In these cases, shareholder￿ s decisions not only depend on the relationship be-
tween a lower cost of managing human resources and a lower pro￿tability but also on the
manager￿ s attitude towards risk. In particular, part (a) of proposition 1 shows that if the
di⁄erences over risk between both projects are large enough, the shareholder ￿nds optimal
to implement safe in situations where risky is e¢ cient. The reason is that the manager is
risk averse and in case the shareholder would want to implement risky she should com-
pensate the manager for that risk taking. Hence, the larger the di⁄erences in variances,
the larger the potential save in wages, and eventually the shareholder implements the safe
project.
Instead, part (b) of proposition 1 states that if these di⁄erences are not large enough,
shareholder￿ s distortions may be of two types. If the value of the quiet life behavior is not
very large, the main e⁄ect that dominates is still the save on wages through risk-taking.
Yet, if the value of the quiet-life behavior is large enough, shareholder￿ s distortion con-








cost (high a) and a lower pro￿tability (high r). In this case, the loss on pro￿tability
dominates the save on wages, which in turn imply that the shareholder implements risky
when safe is the e¢ cient decision.
Let us represent these e⁄ects graphically. In the ￿rst picture, we describe part (a) of
proposition 1 while part (b) is described in the second picture. The black line represents
the threshold in which the shareholder is indi⁄erent between implementing P = R or
P = S when e⁄ort is non-veri￿able. Similarly, the dotted line represents the indi⁄erence
line between implementing safe or risky when e⁄ort is contractible (symmetric information
case).
Fig 2 (a): Distortion over ￿rm￿ s
strategy when the di⁄erence of
variances between projects is large.
Fig 2 (b): Distortion over ￿rm￿ s
strategy when the di⁄erence of
variances between projects is
small.
3.2.2 Asymmetric information: both e⁄ort and project are not contractible
The lack of veri￿ability of manager￿ s decisions imply that the shareholder must o⁄er a
contract depending only on the outcome yP; P 2 fS;Rg; since it is the only veri￿able
source of information. Recall that the choice of the manager￿ s e⁄ort depend not only on
the incentives provided by the shareholder but also on the choice of project. Yet, the
shareholder cannot contract on such decision. This implies that the payment scheme, in
particular ￿, is the only mechanism available for the shareholder to induce the manager
to select the right actions.








worth to do it, i.e., she will o⁄er a payment scheme such that the manager prefers to
implement the risky project. Formally, P = R will be chosen if
CER ￿ CES




























In words, the manager will choose the risky project if the costs from adopting "risky"
are lower than the costs from adopting "safe". The LHS of the last equation represents
the costs from adopting the safe project. The safe project reduce the expected value of
the ￿rm by r, which is partially internalized through the payment scheme (￿). The RHS
of the equation represents the cost from adopting the risky project. The choice of the
risky project suppose two di⁄erent costs for the manager: he must bear a higher level of
risk as well as a larger cost of managing human resources. Therefore, if the shareholder
wants to implement risky by providing optimal incentives, she o⁄ers an optimal payment
scheme f￿;￿g that maximizes her expected pro￿ts given that the manager accepts the
contract and he has incentives to select the right e⁄ort and risky project. Formally,
Max
f￿;￿;g
((1 ￿ ￿)eR ￿ ￿)
s:t: CE ￿ U; (ICCe when R); (ICCd=R)
Let us ￿x the value of the "quiet-life" parameter in order to get the intuition of the solution
to the shareholder￿ s problem. If the opportunity cost of choosing safe is high enough (a
high r), the manager has the tendency to choose "risky" since he internalizes part of this
cost (through ￿). Therefore, the shareholder selects the level of incentives, i.e. ￿, as the
mechanism that induces the manager to select the right e⁄ort: the shareholder selects the
same incentives to the case where ￿rm￿ s project is veri￿able. Instead, if the opportunity
cost of switching from risky to safe is small (low r) the shareholder cannot choose the
same incentive scheme since in this case the manager would change to "safe". Hence, the
shareholder optimally lowers the incentive mechanism. By lowering the incentives and








the manager ￿nds optimal to implement risky.10
In order to determine the optimal decision, we need to do the same exercise by an-
alyzing which is the optimal contract that the shareholder should o⁄er if she wants to
implement "safe". Formally, the shareholder should solve the following program
Max
f￿;￿g
((1 ￿ ￿)(eS ￿ rdS) ￿ ￿)






Yet, the solution to this problem is very similar to the previous one. Let us ￿x quiet-life
behavior to obtain the intuition of the shareholder￿ s program, as we did in the previous
program. If the opportunity cost of choosing safe instead of risky (i.e., r) is not very high,
the shareholder chooses the same payment scheme as if the choice of the project would
have been veri￿able. The idea is that the manager has a tendency to choose safe (quiet-life
behavior) and since the costs of choosing "safe"(r) are not very high she is not concerned
about this restriction. Instead, if the opportunity cost is high enough the shareholder
cannot opt for the same incentive scheme because the manager would implement a risky
project. Therefore, the shareholder optimally empowers the incentive scheme by linking
them to both the opportunity cost and the quiet-life behavior. By doing this the manager
internalizes more the costs of choosing safe than the costs of selecting risky, which in turn
imply that the manager opts for "safe". Let us summarize the optimal contract in the
following lemma, where rR(a) ￿
a+￿￿￿2
2(1+￿￿2
R) and rS(a) ￿
(1+a)(a+￿￿￿2)
2(1+a+￿￿2
S) are both increasing in
the manager￿ s quiet-life parameter a:
Lemma 2 If the manager has discretion on both the e⁄ort and the ￿rm￿ s project, then:





R if r ￿ rR and ￿R = 2r
a+￿￿￿2 if r < rR





S if r ￿ rS and ￿S = 2r
a+￿￿￿2 if r > rS
10Consider that the shareholder wants to implement risky but if ￿ = 1
1+￿m￿2
R




2 (a+￿m￿￿2) for some parameters: Hence, if the shareholder lowers the incentives, the RHS








From Lemma 2 we learn which is the optimal payment schem that the shareholder
should implement when she wants to induce a given project and the corresponding level of
e⁄ort. Yet, the shareholder wants to know which is the project that maximizes pro￿ts and
this is attained by comparing the level of pro￿ts achieved when the shareholder induces
the manager to implement the safe project and the pro￿ts obtained when she induces the
manager to implement risky project. Let us represent graphically the constraint stated






Fig 3: Implementation of both
strategies through optimal
incentive scheme
Figure 3 represents for every combination of parameters (r;a) which is the shape of the
optimal contract when the shareholder implements either "safe" or "risky". To be precise,
the dashed line represents part (a) of Lemma 2, i.e.the combination of parameters such
that the shareholder is indi⁄erent about the shape of the contract in order to implement
"risky". Analogously, the continuous line represents part (b) of lemma 2 and determines
which should be the shape of the contract if "safe" is the project to implement. Let us
focus on the area (II) of the ￿gure 3: in this area the shareholder can implement both
risky and safe project by using the same incentives to the case where the project was
veri￿able. Yet, both in region (I) and (III) this is not the case anymore. For instance, in
region (I) the shareholder can implement "risky" by using the optimal incentives obtained
in Lemma 1 while we need to distort incentives with respect to Lemma 1 for implementing
"safe".








in the region (I) risky seems more appropriate since the opportunity costs of implementing
safe are large. Analogously, in region (III) the shareholder would have a tendency to
choose safe since the quiet-life behavior is large. Finally, in region (II) although it seems
unclear, we are coming back to the case where the decision about the ￿rm￿ s project is
veri￿able where we have already de￿ned where it is better to implement safe or risky.
The following proposition analyzes the comparison of the optimal pro￿ts and de￿nes the
optimal decision regarding ￿rm￿ s project.
Proposition 3 When a quite-life manager has discretion both on the level of e⁄ort and
on the ￿rm￿ s project, then
(a)If r ￿ maxfr1;rRg, the optimal payment scheme is ￿
￿
R and "Risky" is selected.
(b)if r ￿ r1, the optimal payment scheme is ￿
￿
S and "Safe" is selected.
(c)if r 2 [r1;rR], then there exists an b r(a) such that :
c.1) the optimal payment scheme is ￿R = 2r
a+￿￿￿2 and "Risky" is chosen. This situation
takes place if r > b r(a)
c.2) the optimal payment scheme is ￿
￿
S and "safe" is chosen. This situation takes place
if r ￿ b r(a):
As suggested in the initial intuition, the shareholder o⁄ers a contract that implements
"Risky" for large opportunity cost (relative to the quiet-life behavior) as well as she o⁄ers
a contract that implements "safe" whenever the opportunity cost (relative to the quiet-life
behavior) is low enough. This is the situation stated in parts (a) and (b) of proposition
2, respectively. In other words, even if a "quiet-life" manager has also discretion on
the choice of the project, these decisions are not distorted for this range of parameters.
Moreover, the level of incentives provided to the manager is exactly the same to the case
where project was veri￿able (Lemma 2).
Nonetheless, part (c) of Proposition 3 determines the range of parameters where there
exists distortions regarding ￿rm￿ s project when it was veri￿able. From Proposition 1 we
know that the shareholder would have selected the risky project in case the shareholder
would be able to contract upon the project. Yet, this is not true anymore and the manager
have a tendency (quiet-life) to choose the safe project. The shareholder tries to correct
this behavior by lowering incentives (i.e. ￿R = 2r
a+￿￿￿2 < ￿
￿
R if r 2 [r1;rR]). However,








in the next stage of the production process. Therefore, the shareholder ￿nd pro￿table to
induce the manager to select "risky" only if the opportunity cost is high within this region
(r > b r(a)), while she prefers to induce the manager to select "safe" if the opposite takes
place (r ￿ b r(a)). This corresponds to part c.1) and c.2) of Proposition 3, respectively.
Therefore, Proposition 3 states that if the manager has also discretion on the selection
of the project, the shareholder has to implement "safe" in more situations (part c.2 of
Prop.3) than in the case the manager has no discretion about this decision. Yet, we are
concerned with the e⁄ect of such discretion in the managerial decision taking vis-a-vis the
e¢ cient decisions. We ￿nd that the discretion of a quiet-life manager regarding project￿ s
choice is not necessarily bad from the e¢ ciency point of view, that is to say, this behavior
may be a source of recovering e¢ cient decisions (at a cost bear by the shareholder).
The following corollary summarizes the comparison of the choice of the project when the
manager has discretion over this decision and the e¢ cient decisions,
Corollary 1 ( of Proposition 3) When a quiet-life manager has discretion not only on
e⁄ort but also on the choice of the project, it may be the case that
(a) "safe" is chosen when "risky" is e¢ cient. This ine¢ cient behavior is enlarged com-
pared to the situation where the manager has no discretion on such decision. This




(b) e¢ cient decisions are recovered in some situations compared to the case where the
manager has no discretion on such decision. This situation takes place if the di⁄erences
on variance between both project is low enough (￿￿2 < ￿￿2
S￿2
R).
Corollary 3 shows that an increase in manager￿ s discretion when he is concerned about
employees￿preferences might be counterproductive but we ￿nd cases where this is not the
case. Similarly to Proposition 3, the distortions are also induced by the di⁄erence on risk
between both projects. If the di⁄erences on variances is high, a higher manager￿ s discretion
is clearly counterproductive since the manager has the tendency to choose safe even more
since he has control on this decision. However, when the di⁄erence is low enough, the
manager opts for "safe", which is the e¢ cient decision, whereas if the manager has no








3.2.3 Discussion of the results
Consider the following situation: a manager has discretion about the selection of the
projects and the implementation of it (the level of e⁄ort) and a regulator concerned with
shareholder￿ s welfare is planning to implement corporate governance mechanisms aiming
at reducing manager￿ s discretion regarding the selection of projects.11 Our results state
that even if this mechanism is available, we should not directly expect an increase in the
e¢ cient decision taking. The potential bene￿ts derived from this policy are linked not
only to the quiet-life behavior but also to the available alternatives that the ￿rm has.
In particular, assume that the safe project is the status quo project. If the ￿rm is in a
market/sector where the alternative project implies only a moderate increase in risk (we
may think on mature sectors), then having manager￿ s discretion on such decision might be
better vis-a-vis a situation where this decision is contractible. To be precise, the e¢ ciency
depends on the value taken by the quiet-life behavior, and it is only e¢ ciency enhancing
when the quiet-life behavior is important relative to the risk-taking. As commented
previously, a plausible interpretation of di⁄erent values of the quiet-life parameter may
be found in the institutional framework (Botero et al., 2004). Therefore, Anglo-Saxon
countries should tend to reduce manager￿ s discretion but that policy should not be applied
always in Continental European countries or countries where the quiet-life parameter is
important, as showed in Corollary 1. This policy should be promoted in markets/sectors
where the alternative projects has a high risk (innovative projects) since a shareholder
has the mechanisms to bear the risk (actually, we assume she is risk-neutral) while a
risk-averse manager might have incentives to deter new e¢ cient projects in order to gain
on quiet-life.
4 Conclusion
This paper conveys the attention to a shareholder-manager relationship where the man-
ager is aligned with employees￿preferences. We model it by means of a principal-agent
model. We assume that the manager is an agent having discretion not only on the im-
11For instance, any Corporate Governance Code calls for an independent board in which the imple-









plementation of the project but also on the selection of it. A quiet-life manager is not
indi⁄erent between di⁄erent projects for two reasons: the manager is risk averse and em-
ployees put pressure on the manager for choosing the safest project among the available
ones. Under this framework, we show that if the manager has discretion on both decisions
and the quiet-life behavior is important, it might be better (in terms of choosing the right
project) that the manager has discretion over both variables than a situation where the
choice of the project is in hands of the shareholder. In other words, if improving cor-
porate governance means reducing manager￿ s discretion (as any Corporate Governance
Code suggest), it may be the case that it generates distortions on the manager￿ s decision
taking. Therefore, if the regulator is concerned about e¢ ciency the design of corporate
governance rules should take into account this bias.
Under this framework, it is possible to obtain predictions regarding ownership struc-
tures or competition. Concerning ownership structures, it is fairly observed that while in
Anglo-Saxon countries the main pattern is represented by a dispersed ownership, in Con-
tinental Europe concentrated ownership appears to be the main pattern (La Porta et al,
1999). When the shareholder need to hire a quiet-life manager in an environment where
employees can in￿ uence managerial decisions, we should expect that the shareholder has
incentives to participate more actively, i.e. monitor management through acquiring a
large stake of the company. Regarding competition, we claim that the role of a quiet-life
manager might have a positive e⁄ect when competing. In a nutshell, the choice of the
project has an e⁄ect on the level of e⁄ort selected by the manager in the next stage and
it also depends on the capacity of the employees to in￿ uence manager￿ s decisions. Then,
it might be the case that the manager can construct relationships with employees (Allen
and Gale, 2000). A ￿rm that has to compete in these environments may be able to build
a competitive advantage with regard to a ￿rm where the manager faces a lower in￿ uence
from employees. This potential competitive advantage may arise if di⁄erent ￿rms compete
in a new emerging market where the labour market is protected.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Part (a) of Lemma 1 is obtained by solving the following program:
Max
f￿;￿;eg
(1 ￿ ￿)eR ￿ ￿









￿ U; eR = ￿
The lagrangian of this program taking into account that eR = ￿ is







Hence, looking for FOC, we get that
@L(￿;￿;￿)
@￿
= 0 () ￿ = 1 and
@L(￿;￿;￿)
@￿





which in turn imply that CEP=R = U since ￿ = 1:
Finally, pro￿ts are obtained by plugging the optimal contract in the objective function.
Formally,
BP=R = (1 ￿ ￿
￿)e
￿

















In a similar vein, part (b) of Lemma 2 is obtained by solving
Max
f￿;￿;eg
(1 ￿ ￿)(eS ￿ r) ￿ ￿










￿ U; es = ￿(1 + a)
The Lagrangian of this program taking into account that es = ￿(1 + a) is




(1 + a ￿ ￿￿
2
S) ￿ U]
Hence, looking for FOC, we get that
@L(￿;￿;￿)
@￿
= 0 () ￿ = 1 and
@L(￿;￿;￿)
@￿
= 0 () ￿
￿ =
1 + a
1 + a + ￿￿2
S
and pro￿ts are obtained by plugging the optimal contract in the objective function, which
in turn imply that
BP=S = (1 ￿ ￿
￿)(eS ￿ r) ￿ ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿
￿)￿























Proof of Proposition 1. It follows straightforward by comparing the level of pro￿ts
obtained when the project is risky and when it is safe.
Proof of Proposition 2. Before proving this proposition, let us analyze the prop-
erties of r1(a) and rFB(a). It is easy to check that r1(a) is increasing and (strictly) convex
with r1(0) > 0, while rFB(a) is increasing and linear with rFB(0) = 0.
Finally, there exists only one a = ￿￿2
￿￿2
S￿2









In order to prove this proposition, recall that in case of e¢ cient decisions, it is e¢ cient
to choose risky if r > rFB(a) and safe if the opposite is true. Then if ￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿2
S￿2
R part






2 = rFB(a), which in
turn imply that if r < r1 the shareholder will choose safe while risky is e¢ cient at least
for some opportunity cost r.
Part (b) is obtained if ￿￿2 < ￿￿2
S￿2





2. Parts b.1) and b.2) are obtained by noting that rFB(a) is linear while r1(a) is
convex and r1(a = 0) > rFB(a = 0) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Before proving this lemma, it is clear that the [PC] is binding
since the ￿x part ￿ is substracting in the objective function and therefore the shareholder
wants to make it as small as possible. Hence, part (a) of Lemma 2 is obtained by solving
Max
f￿;￿g























2)) = 0 and ￿ ￿ 0
where ￿ is the K-T multiplier associated to the incentives constraints. Therefore if ￿ = 0,
we get ￿ = 1
1+￿￿2
R and ￿r ￿
￿2
2 (a + ￿￿￿2) > 0 () ￿ > 2r
a+￿￿￿2 which implies that it
happens if r ￿ rR. Hence, if r < rS, then ￿ = 2r
a+￿￿2
R since ￿ > 0. This corresponds to
part (a). Part (b) is obtained by solving the analogous program for project safe. Formally,
Max
f￿;￿g




















And from FOC and K-T conditions we derive:
￿ =
1 + a ￿ ￿







2) ￿ ￿r) = 0 and ￿ ￿ 0
where ￿ is the K-T multiplier associated to the incentives constraints. Therefore if ￿ = 0,
we get ￿ =
1+a￿￿
1+a+￿￿2
R and ￿r ￿
￿2
2 (a + ￿￿￿2) < 0 () ￿ < 2r
a+￿￿￿2 which implies that it
happens if r ￿ rS. Hence, if r > rS, then ￿ = 2r
a+￿￿2
R since ￿ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. From Proposition 1 if r < r1 safe is preferred to risky. From
Lemma 2 if r < rR the optimal incentive is ￿ = 2r
a+￿￿￿2 which implies that pro￿ts cannot
be larger than pro￿ts achieved with ￿ = 1
1+￿￿2
R. In other words, Bs( 1+a
1+a+￿￿2
S) ￿ BR( 1
1+￿￿2
R)
whenever r < r1 and since r < rr, it implies BR( 1
1+￿￿2
R) ￿ BR( 2r
a+￿￿￿2). Therefore, this
proves part (b).
Similar to this, if r > rR and r < r1, the optimal decision is to implement safe by applying
the same argument than part (b). This corresponds to part (a).
In order to prove part (c), we need to realize that the following is true: at r = rR
the shareholder is indi⁄erent between choosing ￿ = 2r
a+￿￿2
R and ￿ = 1
1+￿￿2
R in order to
implement risky. Then since r1 < rR; it implies that at r = rR BR ￿ BS. Similarly at
r = r1 BR ￿ BS, since by de￿nition at r = r1 BR( 1
1+￿￿2
R) = BS( 1+a
1+a+￿￿2
S), but since r < rR
this implies BR( 1
1+￿￿2
R) ￿ BR( 2r
a+￿￿2
R). Finally, to prove part (c) we only need to check
that there exists such b r(a). Note that for all a in this set,
@BR
@r > 0 and
@BS
@r < 0. Thus,
there exists an b r(a) such that if r > b r(a) then BR > BS, while if the opposite takes place,
BR < BS.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2. The
only di⁄erence arises in the region corresponding to Part (c) of Proposition 3. If risk is
low r1 = rFB and we may have improved choices since now P = S is selected more often.
Otherwise, there is an increase in the ine¢ ciency.
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